Why it's Unlikely Kosovo Will Ever Descend Into All Out War Again.

POSTED: 09:40 (BST) 02/10/2023

In June 2024, it will be exactly 25 years since the signing of the Kumanovo agreement marked the end of the Kosovo War and laid the foundations for the territory’s self-declaration of independence in 2008. Essentially, we should be approaching 25 years of peace in Kosovo.

However, in actuality the territory has not fully been at peace at all during this 25 year period. Instead, tensions have remained heightened between the majority Kosovo-Albanian ethnic population and the minority Kosovan-Serb ethnic population. The two communities (for the most part) live in entirely separate areas of the territory and very rarely interact with one another. The Albanians don’t really understand why the Serbs continue to inhabit what they see as the ‘Republic of Kosovo’, and the Serbs see the ‘Republic of Kosovo’ as being little more than a faux identity which has been given to what they, and the state of Serbia see as being a region of the Republic of Serbia. Who is correct in this debate, varies depending on which state you ask the question to. But, the essence is that peace, harmony and prosperity have not graced Kosovo, as many would have hoped.

In fact, over the past 10 months tensions have escalated considerably and have taken the currently frozen/inactive conflict status to the brink.

In January of this year, a disagreement over the utilising of Serbian number plates which referenced Kosovo as a region of the Republic, led to border closures and the mobilisation of Serbian troops into the border regions. Pristina (the administrative capital of Kosovo) and Belgrade managed to cool the situation and re-open the borders, but many saw just how quickly this specific situation can escalate.

In May, tensions soared again, as boycotted Mayoral elections led to Serb dominated regions of the territory being governed by ethnic Albanians. This led to violent protests by Serbs and clashes between them and the Albanian dominated Kosovo Police. It also forced the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops, who remained in the territory to oversee the peace following the end of the War, to prepare for potential engagement. At the same time, Belgrade again mobilised Serbian troops to the border. Yet again, there was a de-escalation in tensions of sorts. This was despite the best efforts of Serbian tennis star Novak Djokovic, who at the French Open, wrote on a camera lens in his native Serbian that, ‘Kosovo is the heart of Serbia’.

It appeared that turbulence in Kosovo was dying down and returning to the frosty, but more peaceful times which have been endured in the territory over the past 25 years. But, just as this appeared to be taking place, the situation suddenly escalated to an entirely new level.

On Monday 25 September, reports started coming from Kosovo that there had been more clashes between ethnic Serbs and the Kosovo Police, but that this time they involved a gunfight between the two sides. 30 armed Serbs barricaded themselves inside a monastery close to the border with Serbia. When the Kosovo Police arrived, a gunfight ensued and lasted for most of the day. Pristina and the EU both pointed a finger at Belgrade, hinting at a supposedly state orchestrated escalation of territories. Belgrade pointed its finger back at Pristina, as well as blaming the NATO KFOR troops for not acting to protect ethnic Serbs in Kosovo.

Pristina has since claimed to have the situation and its territory under control. But this whole incident has really pushed the idea of a new war in Kosovo a lot closer to the front of many people’s minds.

But is it really likely? Will Serbia really ever take on NATO in an attempt to reclaim the territory of Kosovo?

Well, it certainly seems to be an ever increasing position of possibility. What is concerning to me, is that if I had to come up with a scenario that would start the ‘Second Kosovo War’, it would be configured in quite a similar nature to the already referenced significantly heightened recent tensions in the territory.

For conflict to be avoided it is absolutely necessary that dialogue remains between Pristina and Belgrade. More significantly, it is important that despite their clearly differing views on the case and status of Kosovo, that both sides still have peace at the forefront of their agendas. However, what the last 10 months of relations has shown us, is that such a dialogue is becoming more and more strained.

It certainly seems that Pristina is happy to keep pushing Kosovo’s Serb minority and in a way views itself as being quite untouchable. Practically the entirety of ‘The West’, including the USA, UK and most of the EU backs Kosovo’s independence and Pristina’s right to control all the territory in the region. Not to mention the protection the NATO KFOR troops provide to Pristina’s regime and Kosovan identity and independence as a whole.

On the flipside, the Serbian perspective on how to deal with Kosovo is a divided one. The current President Aleksandar Vučić has been frequently criticised for not taking a stronger stance against Pristina’s treatment of Serbs. Vučić’s position on the matter is that Kosovo is a region of Serbia, but that it has de facto independence from Belgrade. This de facto independence, which Vučić sees as being financially and forcefully backed by ‘The West’, leaves Belgrade with only the option of force should they try to retake Kosovo. But Vučić is very much against this position and views it as non attainable, mainly due to the NATO presence in Kosovo, but also due to NATO’s own previous record of aggression against Serbia itself. There is no doubt that had NATO had no involvement in the Kosovo War at the end of the 1990’s, that Kosovo wouldn’t appear on many of our maps as it does today. Nor would there be such a hatred for the organisation amongst Serbians and the wider Serb community.

Photograph of the remnants of NATO's bombing campaign against Serbia, which I took on a recent visit to Belgrade.

Vučić’s perspective is shared by a lot of Serbia’s political parties, it’s one of frustration and anger, mitigated by understanding and reality. An understanding and reality not shared by absolutely every Serbian political position. Serbians are on average very nationalistic, a position which has been cultivated via their education and often murky history. The way this impacts politics in the country is very dramatic, as even those like Vučić, who sits to the right on the political spectrum, are accused of being traitors to the Serbian people. Those further to the right, mimic Vučić’s opinions on Kosovo, the only difference is that there are no limits to the way in which they would attempt to achieve these desires.

Street art that I photographed on a recent visit to Belgrade. It says 'when the army returns to Kosovo'. I didn't quite understand its full message, but from the colours I could guess the artist's position on Kosovo.

If Serbian power slipped to a party on the radical right of the spectrum, then a Serbian invasion of Kosovo would certainly become foreseeable, as the required dialogue for peace between Pristina and Belgrade would completely cease to exist. However, such a scenario is unlikely to play out due to the country’s main extreme right political party (Serbian Party Oathkeepers) currently only holding just over 3% of all seats in the Serbian General Assembly.

The only other foreseeable scenario for a ‘Second Kosovo War’ is if NATO chooses to withdraw its KFOR troops from the territory, or if the states which contribute troops to KFOR stop their supply. When it was formed, it was expected that KFOR wouldn’t last forever, but the aforementioned frosty relations between Albanians and Serbs, have led to its operations being extended. However, there will likely come a point where KFOR does pull out, but the conditions that would need to be in place for this remain uncertain. Hypothetically though, when KFOR leaves Kosovo, Pristina’s only protection from Belgrade would become the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), which is essentially its equivalent of an armed forces. Serbia’s Armed Forces outnumber those of the KSF at a ratio of over 2:1, making a Serbian victory in an attempted reclamation of the territory, post-KFOR pullout, seem likely. But victory in this scenario would certainly not be a given, dependent on the numbers committed to such an operation by Belgrade and the potential redeployment of NATO troops to Kosovo. Additionally, NATO may choose to launch attacks against Serbia itself, as it did during the initial war at the end of the 1990’s. This again, may act as a deterrence from Belgrade even launching an invasion post the end of KFOR’s deployment. This is not a scenario we will see play out until at least 2026, as that is when current KFOR commitments end. They may of course be extended in the meantime.

Ultimately, NATO’s presence and involvement in Kosovo makes the likelihood of all out war seem very minimal. Combined with the frustrated, but often co-operational role of Belgrade in maintaining dialogue with Pristina and peace in the territory, war should not be expected anytime soon. There are, as discussed, scenarios in which war would become more foreseeable. But, for the time being at least those scenarios themselves remain unforeseeable.