What Can We Take From Putin's Recent Meeting with Republika Srpska's Leader?

POSTED: 18:00 (GMT) 27/02/2024


On 21 February 2024, a rather interesting meeting took place between President Putin and the President of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik in the Russian city of Kazan. This is a meeting which has seemingly slipped many geopolitical analysts by, as it has not received much coverage. A position which is understandable, as the meeting really didn’t last for all that long and was purely a matter of formality, as Putin was welcoming Dodik to the opening ceremony for the ‘Games of the Future’. However, despite the very structured and rather non-diplomatic circumstances of their brief encounter, I feel there are some very key learnings we can take from the dialogue between the two sides on both the status of their relationship and how this might come to impact the geopolitics of both the Western Balkans and Europe as a whole. 


Relations between Russia and Republika Srpska appear to be close to an all time high.

This is very much the general overview of the meeting. Both Putin and Dodik made it very clear that they were both thankful for each other's support in what they both view as a battle against ‘The West’. 


Putin thanked Dodik and the wider government of Republika Srpska for their continued dialogue with Moscow, along with stating that he personally looks forward to ‘accomplishing much more’, in the relations between the two regimes. 


Dodik, in turn, referenced that strong relations between Moscow and Banja Luka (the administrative capital of Republika Srpska) were not only existent, but were in fact ‘building and expanding’. Additionally, Dodik thanked Putin for understanding the difficulties faced by Republika Srpska in regards to its ongoing battle for identity against ‘The West’. 


Dodik is showing no position of compromise regarding his demands for an independent state for Republika Srpska.

Dodik is currently facing charges by Sarajevo of ‘defying the rulings of an international peace envoy’. These charges come from Dodik’s refusal to recognise or enforce any rulings being ordered on the state of Bosnia & Herzegovina by Christian Schmidt, a former German Minister, who is currently acting as a peace envoy to Bosnia. 


Dodik referenced these charges in the meeting, suggesting that he was certain that Schmidt’s position within Bosnian lawmaking was illegitimate and that he was destined to try and abolish Republika Srpska. 


Some analysts thought that Dodik’s recent charges and court appearances would lead to a dying down in tensions between Bosnian Serb separatists and Sarajevo, as it might serve to stabilise dialogue between Banja Luka and Sarajevo. However, from Dodik’s words, it appears that these charges have only strengthened anti-Western perspective in Republika Srpska. 


Such sentiment was demonstrated best by Dodik when he referenced the attitude Bosnian Serbs in Srpska have towards ongoing EU sanctions against the territory, stating that, ‘our people say, what does not kill you, makes you stronger’. A statement which really suggests that Bosnian Serbs are not willing to bend when it comes to their perceived geopolitical narrative.


It appears that Putin will continue to support Republika Srpska in its ideological battle with ‘The West’ .

Now there is only so much you can take from the very minimal (and mostly scripted) amount that we know Putin has formally said to Dodik in the space of the last week. However, within it we can find some very key indicators of the Kremlin’s unwavering support for Bosnian Serbs. 


Putin hinted that despite this being the only official meeting between Dodik and himself due to take place over the course of Dodik’s visit to Russia, that there would be further time to discuss bilateral relations between the two parties. Not just this, but bilateral relations ‘across a number of areas’. There is no further expansion on what these areas might be, although there can be some informed guesses.


The obvious areas for discussion are on matters of economic and cultural relations between the two parties. To continue on the current path of ignoring Sarajevo’s  orders and facing increasing sanctions, Srpska will require increased financial support from its allies. As Dodik notes in his dialogue, Srpska does have allies in Europe, namely in Serbia and Hungary, but both are limited in potential economic support that they can provide. Russia, does not in any way face the same limitations as either of these two states, either with regards to resources or restrictions.


Cultural relations don’t need to be fully explained, as they have existed for decades now and are the epitome of the meaning behind the so often utilised ‘Slavic Brotherhood’ mantra. They now not only share similar ethnicity and religion, but geopolitical struggles.


Aside from these two areas there is one other area of imaginable potential discussion, which is the matter of security. The outcome of such a discussion would be very interesting, as recent talks of a resurgence of war in the Western Balkans would place Bosnia at the epicentre of conflict.


The only factor that currently stunts the possibilities of a secondary Bosnian War, is that Republika Srpska has not had its own armed forces since 2006, and are now forbidden under Bosnian law from forming any new armed forces that sit outside the official control of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite this, Dodik has been increasingly vocal about his desires to create such a structure and has already started to build such a platform with the help of the Kremlin.


In 2018, it was reported that Russia had funded the creation and training of a Serb mercenary group on Serbian territory, to be known as ‘Serbian Honour’. The modus operandi of the group was to act as security for Dodik’s regime in Republika Srpska. However, since 2018, not much has been heard of the ‘Serbian Honour’ group. Some online rumours suggest that they were eventually merged into the notorious Wagner Group, whilst some suggest that they have just kept a low profile. 


More recently, Russian intervention in the security affairs has been even more direct. Just 3 months ago, reports came out that suggested Russia was now funding and operating training centres for Bosnian Serb paramilitary groups in Republika Srpska itself, reportedly in a village only 45 kilometres away from Sarajevo. Representatives from both Moscow and Banja Luka denied the claims, but the Bosnian Defence Minister stated that he had video evidence of such activities taking place.