If Kosovo Can Do It, Why Can't Republika Srpska?

POSTED: 09:00 (BST) 16/10/2023

When Kosovo declared its own independence in February 2008, opinion amongst other states on whether to grant it recognition as an independent state was exceptionally divided. The main reason for this division and any uncertainty around providing recognition, stemmed and continues to stem from what has now been labelled as the ‘Kosovo Precedent’.

Put very simply, this ‘precedent’ takes the case of Kosovo as showing that the establishment of de facto control over a given territory within a recognised state can lead to secession. It focuses on how Kosovo managed to declare independence without technically having the legal capability to do so. For many states the thought of condoning such actions is dangerous, as it could lead to Kosovo-esque movements being created within their own respective territories. For example, Russia doesn’t recognise Kosovo because to give such recognition would make the case for Chechen independence. Spain doesn’t recognise Kosovo, as this would go against its hardline position on an independent Catalonian state.

In pretty much every case of states’ non-recognition of Kosovo there exists a fear that the ‘Kosovo Precedent’ threatens territorial integrity. Whilst on the other side, you would think that those who do recognise Kosovo, the vast majority of whom belong to ‘The West’, are profound believers in self-determination. But this is incorrect, as many de facto independent quasi-states exist in the world today with exceptionally minimal or absolutely zero recognition from ‘The West’. The position often taken by states that recognise Kosovo is that every case of state secession is different, and that giving recognition to Kosovo was the most logical outcome to protect the rights and culture of its majority Muslim and ethnic Albanian population.

But what if roughly exactly the same situation occurred the other way around, with an Orthodox Christian ethnic Serb population seeking independence from within a majority Muslim state.

Well this is a scenario we may well see play out at some point in the near future, with the increasing drive for independence amongst the population and politics of one of the Balkans’ lesser analysed territories.

There are very few in the world (even in the fields of geopolitics and IR) who have ever heard of Republika Srpska, let alone understand the ramifications of its existence. As with many of the current geopolitical issues of Europe’s Balkan region, its origins lie within the collapse of Yugoslavia. More specifically in the case of Srpska, they lie within the Bosnian War which ensued as a result of a 1992 referendum held in what was the ‘Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’. The referendum was on the matter of independence from Belgrade and Yugoslavia respectively and was pushed mainly by its majority Muslim Bosniak population. This referendum was boycotted in protest by the entirety of Bosnian Serbs, who constituted and continue to constitute around 30% of the entire population. The Bosnian Serbs did not wish for devolution from Belgrade, or to exit Yugoslavia.

Naturally, the boycott resulted in the declaration of Bosnian state independence and led to Bosniak Alija Izetbegovic, proclaiming himself to be the leader of an independent Bosnia & Herzegovina. However, the Bosnian Serbs and Belgrade were not simply going to let Bosnia slip into such an independence. Shortly after the declaration of independence, Yugoslav tanks rolled into Bosnia and surrounded Sarajevo. Without going into mass detail over what happened next, it must just simply be stated that the most brutal conflict witnessed on the European continent since World War II ensued, and lasted for around 3 and half years.

Few know in depth of this conflict, but many have heard of the ethnic atrocities committed as part of it. The Serbs are those most seen as being behind the ethnic cleansing operations in Bosnia, as today there remain traces of both inhumane massacres and concentration camps utilised by them to exterminate the Bosniak population. However, in the conflict there were also cases of Bosniak atrocities committed against Serbs, which are often forgotten. This doesn’t make the actions of the Serbs in any way justifiable, but completely explains why today Bosnia is as divided as it is.

Following the War, which ultimately left Bosnia outside of Yugoslavia, it was agreed that the state would be divided between two entities. Logically your mind would think that these would be Bosnia and Herzegovina. But no. Instead the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is just one of the entities. The other is the aforementioned Republika Srpska, or as it is translated ‘Serb Republic’. These two entities symbolise the (in majority) ethnic borders of the combined state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Here are the statistics. In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, around 71% of its population is Bosniak or Bosnian Muslim, with a Bosnian Serb population of only around 2.5%. In Republika Srpska, Around 82% of the population are Bosnian Serbs, with a minority Bosniak population of around 14%.

These two entities have their own leadership and administrative capabilities. The culture within them is naturally different, due to the differing ethnic majorities between them. Republika Srpska is covered by Orthodox Churches and flashes of the red, white and blue which has come to be indicative of Serb nationalism. Whereas the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is for the large part dominated by minarets and memorials to those who fought and died for Bosnian independence.

Ultimately, the two entities run practically as entirely different states, with relations between the two consistently being frosty due to differing perspectives on geopolitical alliances. It’s fair to say that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is very much allied with ‘The West’ and would like Bosnia to join the EU and NATO. Alternatively, Republika Srpska desires for close affiliation to the ‘domovina’ in Serbia.

In recent years, these differing desires have come close to completely disintegrating relations between the two entities. In 2021, Milorad Dodik, the leader of Republika Srpska, stated that plans were in place for the creation of a Bosnian Serb paramilitary. This sent waves of panic throughout the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as many feared a Second Bosnian War may become a reality. Now in 2023, Dodik is continuously stating that Republika Srpska ought to be granted independence from Bosnia. This has mainly come following Bosnia being given candidate status for the EU in December last year. Dodik cited that this was not a position that the population of Republika Srpska had been consulted on.

But could Srpska really separate from Bosnia? More importantly would their attempt at independence be treated in a similar fashion to Kosovo? If not, Why not?

On the first matter, it is technically possible for any territory to declare independence. What really matters is whether they have the means to secure their independence.

The first stage of which comes in the form of what is known as de facto independence. The term de facto can literally be translated as ‘in reality’. In the field of geopolitics, de facto independence usually refers to states with no or exceptionally minimal recognition, due to their existence often coming from circumstances deemed to challenge international law and principles of statehood. In many cases, the powers wielded and the administration of de facto independent states, also referred to as proto-states, is exactly the same as what you would find in a recognised state.

In the case of Republika Srpska, it currently has some of what would be required for it to establish itself as a proto-state. It has its own government, laws and education system. Additionally, it also has some economic autonomy. To fully be prepared for a successful declaration of independence they would have to establish some form of defence force, as declarations of independence equal conflict. But as has already been mentioned, Dodik and Srpska were already moving towards this position 2 years ago, so could soon if not already be in a position to defend themselves. There is also a chance that should a conflict between Republika Srpska and the state military of Bosnia and Herzegovina ensue, that many Serb volunteer fighters would go to the aid of Srpska.

But what really matters here is ‘The West’ and what they would do in response to a declaration of independence by Republika Srpska. As it is often ‘The West’ who are the deciding factor when it comes to the second and more formal stage of independence. This is what’s termed as de jure independence, meaning ‘in law’, or in other terms recognised. Not just partially recognised, but recognised by a vast majority of other de jure independent states (basically UN member states).

In the case of Kosovo, ‘The West’ clearly allowed for its de jure status to be progressed, as many states were quick to grant it recognition, such as the UK and US. The background for this, as already touched upon, was to preserve the rights and culture of Kosovo’s Albanian majority. Now, should Republika Srpska gain de facto independence, they would probably argue a very similar case and likely have votes to prove it.

So then surely ‘The West’ should also provide Srpska with de jure status? Well whilst you might think this to be logical, the answer would likely be a firm no. In fact, ‘The West’ would probably condemn Republika Srpska’s declaration of independence.

But why?

Well, whilst states have refused to recognise Kosovo over the already mentioned ‘precedent’ for secession that it represents, it is important to note that actually this ‘precedent’ only exists when ‘The West’ wants it to. This may seem confusing, so I’ll break it down.

‘The West’ effectively has the say on whether or not secessionist states gain de jure independence. This decision is ultimately driven by both moral, but most significantly geopolitical reasoning. To use Kosovo as a case in point, ‘The West’ was definitely concerned by the reports of ethnic atrocities being carried out by Serbs on ethnic Albanians, and their initial intervention was fuelled by an ambition to stop this. However, the geopolitical ramifications of assisting Kosovo in gaining its independence were also important in the intervention of ‘The West, as it allowed for the further deterioration of Belgrade’s previously firm hold over power in the Western Balkans. Ultimately, Kosovo presented itself as a case where its secession suited ‘The West’ and its ambitions, so they essentially granted it de jure independence.

This geopolitical tint to whether or not the Kosovo precedent is acted upon by ‘The West’ can also be witnessed in the examination of the stance it has taken over de facto independent breakaway states who don’t present as geopolitically compatible. For example, If we examine the cases of the pro-Russian de facto independent separatist states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (widely recognised as being de jure territories of Georgia), it is clear that ‘The West’ has never had or likely will ever have any interest in giving them recognition. This is despite there being an evident desire for independence from their related populations, along with a supposed feeling that Georgia is not representative of either their culture or history, in similar fashion to Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian population’s opinion on Serbia.

It is this geopolitical requirement of ‘The West’ in its treatment towards secessionist states, which is why if Republika Srpska decided to declare independence it is unlikely that it would ever gain de jure independent status. ‘The West’ fears an independent Srpska, due to its close relations with Serbia, a state which is still generally seen as a threat to Westernisation across Europe.

The ‘Kosovo precedent’ only has the capability to exist and thrive in scenarios where it is non-detrimental to the ‘The West’ and its wider ambitions. This is why Kosovo was able to gain de jure independence, whilst Republika Srpska would likely be condemned for their secession.