joelgibson.co.uk - Armenia, Azerbaijan and the CSTO

What do Tensions Between Armenia and Azerbaijan Tell Us About Russia and the CSTO?

POSTED: 09:20 (GMT) 26/03/2024

On 20 March 2024, Nikol Pashinyan, the current Prime Minister of Armenia told various news outlets that a resurgence of conflict between his own state and neighbouring Azerbaijan was looking increasingly likely.

Hostilities have raged between the two unfriendly neighbours since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Following their respective transitions from Soviet republics to independent states, relations between Yerevan and Baku (the two respective capitals) quickly disintegrated. Within the USSR, both territories had ultimately taken their directives from Moscow and had thus been coherent gambits in a much larger geopolitical mass. However, as independent states, the two sides quickly realised there was not much in the way of shared identity to maintain the Soviet era levels of cooperation. Armenia is a majority ethnically Armenian and Orthodox Christian populated country, whilst Azerbaijan is a majority Turkic ethnic state, with the main religion being Islam.

These differences have been crucial in sparking the series of conflicts which have come to define the relationship between Yerevan and Baku over the past 30+ years. All of these conflicts were primarily focussed on the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which has also been known as the Republic of Artsakh. I have written an in-depth piece on these conflicts here, which examines the entire background to the conflicts and how territory has been exchanged between the two sides since the end of the USSR.

The TLDR on Nagorno-Karabakh is that it is a territory within the confines of Azerbaijan, that was historically populated by ethnic Armenians. The ethnic Armenians living within Nagorno-Karabakh (with the assistance of Yerevan), declared an independent state within the territory, known as the ‘Republic of Artsakh’. This declaration naturally irritated Azerbaijan, who consistently cited that Nagorno-Karabakh was Azeri territory and should therefore be under the control of Baku. Yerevan’s response was that it was historically Armenian territory which hadn't been accounted for by the Soviet authorities. Essentially, the two sides couldn’t agree and so the first Nagorno-Karabakh War ensued. On this occasion, Armenia was very much the victor, taking the Nagorno-Karabakh region along with some additional Azeri territories to its west in order to create a sizable land bridge between Armenia proper and the Republic of Artsakh. For 26 years, this remained the status quo and Armenia basqued in its glory of unifying the Armenian population across what it saw as its native territory.

1994 Borders

Armenia did not foresee any attempt by Azerbaijan to retake Nagorno-Karabakh, naively ignoring a 24 billion dollar increase in military expenditure by Baku between 2008 and 2019. Along with this, Armenia also blindly ignored consistent Azeri rhetoric, maintaining that Nagorno-Karabakh was Azerbaijan and that this was always going to be Baku’s position. For Yerevan, Nagorno-Karabakh was a chapter closed, whilst for Baku, it was one whose ending was still to be written.

On 27 September 2020, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War began. This time, the result was remarkably different. Azeri forces launched a brutal offensive on Armenian held territory, including occupied Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian forces attempted to fight back, but they had neither the weaponry nor numbers to withstand the Azeri assault. Within 2 months, a new ceasefire agreement had been ratified which significantly favoured Baku, letting it keep whatever territory it had taken in the conflict, alongside having previously Armenian occupied territories returned to its control. Critically, this agreement did not dissolve the Republic of Artsakh, but led to around 2,000 Russian peacekeeping troops being moved into its new territorial boundaries. Additionally, Armenia still maintained a corridor (Lachin) into Nagorno-Karabakh, preventing the isolation of the distinct ethnic Armenian populace within the territory.

2020 Borders

Whilst the 2020 defeat was humiliating for Yerevan, it could have theoretically been so much worse. Azeri troops could have easily pushed on to claim control of the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh and dissolve the Republic of Artsakh for good. Within this status quo, Yerevan envisaged the long-term survival of Artsakh as a territory for Armenians and Armenian culture to flourish. At least now there were Russian troops within the territory, whose purpose was to maintain the peace and prevent Azeri attacks on Armenians and vice versa. This was the situation for the following 2 years, as despite occasional skirmishes taking place, there was a sense of peace and stabilisation.

However, in December 2022, this relative peace again descended into chaos, as Azeri forces blockaded the Lachin Corridor from Armenia into Nagorno-Karabakh and subsequently installed a checkpoint along this route. These moves by Azerbaijan led to a humanitarian crisis within Nagorno-Karabakh, as essential supplies were consistently being blocked from entering. The Russian peacekeeping forces were relatively helpless in this situation and were slightly confused as to what action they should be taking. This position proved excessively costly the following year, as Azeri forces again launched a military operation against Nagorno-Karabakh. Reports which came out of the territory suggested that the Russians did absolutely nothing to try and obstruct the advance.

This time the result of the Azeri attack was conclusive. Nearly all of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population left the territory, fearing for their lives, whilst it was formally agreed that the Republic of Artsakh would be formally dissolved on 1 January 2024. Nagorno-Karabakh was going to be the de facto territory of Azerbaijan.

For Yerevan, the dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh was both harrowing and humiliating. They had failed to protect and preserve the Armenian culture and history within Nagorno-Karabakh and now had many ethnic Armenians within their own borders without homes.

More than this though, it gave great concern to the Armenian government about the future security of its own recognised borders. It had placed trust in Moscow to protect ethnic Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh, but it appeared that when it came to fulfilling such a duty, there was no action taken.

In a wider context, this lack of Russian action is very significant, as Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), which is supposedly Russia’s alternative to NATO. The CSTO is not nearly as powerful as NATO, having only 6 members, but the raison d’etre for its existence is very similar. Significantly, the CSTO holds an article 4, which is remarkably similar to NATO’s article 5. This article stipulates that an attack on one member is taken as an attack on all members and would therefore be resolved by the intervention of a combined CSTO taskforce. This article was enacted most recently in Kazakhstan in 2022, where CSTO forces were ordered to quash anti-government protests.

In the case of Armenia, membership of the CSTO comes as a way of securing its own security, with Yerevan initially hoping that Russia in particular would act as its protector in the event of an invasion of de jure Armenian territory. However, the lack of action taken by Russian peacekeeping forces with regards to protecting the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, has led to Yerevan publicly stating that they no longer see Russia as a guarantor of Armenian state sovereignty in the event of an invasion by Azerbaijan.

Despite Baku having withdrawn its own membership from the CSTO back in 1999, Yerevan is likely very correct on this point. Even though Russia would technically be obliged to provide military assistance to Armenia in the event of its invasion, it would be hard to envisage a scenario in which Russian troops were sent to fight Azeri forces. Russia’s position within the post-Soviet space is one where it wants to preserve and potentially increase as much influence as possible. Russian forces coming into direct combat with Azeri forces would indefinitely corrode the already slightly strained relations between Baku and Moscow. Whilst, inaction would cement a break in lasting cooperation between the Kremlin and Yerevan. Interestingly, it is the latter of these that Moscow would likely be least bothered about, as Azerbaijani power is growing whilst Armenian power has been stunted for decades.

The growth of Azerbaijan’s power has been boosted by its strong alliance with Turkey, which has resulted in plans being drawn up for a pan-Turkic corridor to be created between the two states. This corridor would have to bypass Armenian territory, by connecting Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan exclave with the main body of the Azeri state. It is incredibly likely that an Azeri invasion of Armenia would come as a result of a desire to annex the required territory for this project to take place. Azerbaijan’s military currently remains much more capable than that of Armenia, and so in the event of an invasion it would seem almost certain that Azerbaijan would get what it wanted.

For Moscow, what really matters is that either way Azerbaijan will likely get what they desire in the creation of the pan-Turkic corridor, which could fundamentally serve to impact Russian influence within the FSU. This is because the creation of the pan-Turkic highway could serve to economically unify the Turkic world, creating a transit route between its heart in Ankara and the ex-Soviet Turkic states of Central Asia via the Caspian Sea. In order for Russia to try and maintain their lasting influence in this region, they understand that they must try and maintain relations with Baku, who will have the opportunity to stunt Moscow’s presence in Central Asia.

The potential influence of a potential pan-Turkic corridor between Ankara and Baku

Armenia is very aware of the Kremlin’s flexible approach towards foreign alliances, in order to maximise Russian influence, consolidating Yerevan’s statement that Russia couldn’t be trusted to protect Armenia’s security. More than this though, Yerevan’s statement seemingly suggests that the CSTO and the enactment of its various articles only exist when Russia wants them to. The CSTO is not really an intergovernmental military alliance at all, but is rather a weapon of Kremlin foreign policy to be used and applied only when Moscow sees fit. The CSTO has never been a respectable counterpart to NATO in size, but now it appears despite seemingly being a mimic of the world’s largest military alliance, its modus operandi isn’t even befitting of an imitation.

The CSTO has essentially unofficially dissolved. Russia’s unwillingness to assist members of this very alliance in cases which don’t directly benefit the Kremlin’s foreign policy ambitions within the FSU is proof of this. In a certain nature it could be suggested that the CSTO never really existed in its presented guise at any stage, but that it has always simply been a way for Moscow to justify intervention and influence in the organisations’ member states should it want to.

In the case of Armenia, Moscow does not view a potential invasion by Azerbaijan as something which could threaten its foreign policy ambitions within the FSU. On the contrary, Russia views any potential intervention in such a conflict as something which might actually damage such ambitions elsewhere. So, despite being obliged to do so by the very CSTO articles it crafted itself, Moscow offering protection to Yerevan in the case of war is highly unlikely. For Armenia, this is a difficult situation, as they cannot simply find a replacement protector for Russia, who are contracted to have an active military presence within the territory until 2044. It is therefore no surprise that as recently as last week, Yerevan expressed that they would willingly cede territory to avoid invasion, as at present invasion could truly destroy Armenia.