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An End to the Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh?

Why Was it so Turbulent? Why is Turkey Important? And What's Russia's Position?

POSTED: 09:40 (BST) 02/10/2023

Just over a week ago, tensions in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh escalated to a status of active conflict for the second time in the past 3 years. The result of which seems to have spelled a definitive end to the decades long tensions. But what exactly was the issue in Nagorno-Karabakh? And what was and is Russia’s position on the matter?

For those unfamiliar with the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, or as it is known by some the Republic of Artsakh, it is a classic example of the ignorance given to both ethnic groupings and history when borders for the majority of Soviet republics were constructed in the 1920’s.The borders drawn by the architects of the Soviet Union’s numerous administrative districts, often included significant groupings of ethnic minorities traditionally heralding from one Soviet republic, within another.

In this particular case we are talking about a large swathe of ethnic Armenians who found themselves within the territorial boundaries of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). Naturally, it would have made more sense for them to have been included in the Armenian SSR, but this was entirely overlooked when the initial borders were drawn. So, this significant population of ethnic Armenians found themselves within a republic in which the culture was quite distinctly different to their own. Armenians are historically a majority Christian populous, whereas their Azeri counterparts are in majority Muslim. Their languages and customs are also very different. Armenian is of Indo-European origin and Azerbaijani, or as it’s also known Azeri, is a Turkic language very similar to nearby Turkey. As a result of these differences, the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, in which this ethnic Armenian population found itself became a dedicated autonomous region within the SSR of Azerbaijan.

Despite their differences, during the period of Soviet rule, the two republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, along with the autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh all existed in relative harmony. This was in large part due to the fact that they both ultimately functioned as subsidiaries of Moscow’s power. As Moscow would not have wanted there to be in-fighting within the Union, it did its best to limit the autonomy and power either side could potentially have over the other. Additionally, there was no requirement for either side to try and overpower the other, as at the end of the day they were both part of the same nation.

Problems began to resurface in this relationship towards the end of the USSR, most of which were the fault of Mikhail Gorbachev. When Gorbachev gave the USSR the policies glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring), he did not anticipate they would bring with them rebirths of hardline nationalism and fundamentally the end of the Union. But, that’s exactly what they did. Between 1988 and 1991, the various SSRs of the USSR all became independent states, occupying the territory they had each ‘administered’ within the Union.

In the case of the newly born independent republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, this created a major point of dispute. What was going to happen to Nagorno-Karabakh?

The Azerbaijani perspective was that it fell under the territory of the SSR of Azerbaijan and therefore should now fall under the jurisdiction of Baku (Azerbaijan’s chosen capital). Unsurprisingly, the Armenians completely disagreed, citing that Nagorno-Karabakh had been given its own autonomy within the Azeri SSR and that its population was distinctly ethnically Armenian.

Arguments ensued between Yerevan (Armenia’s chosen capital) and Baku for months, whilst within the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh itself tensions were rising between the majority ethnic Armenian populace and the minority Azeris. The Armenians wanted independence or union with Armenia. The Azeris wanted the Armenians to either leave or respect that they were now under the jurisdiction of Baku.

Neither side budged and then in 1991, tensions spilled over into violence and the first conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh ensued. To very briefly summarise the 3 years that this conflict stretched on for, the ethnic Armenians and Yerevan won. Establishing the de facto independent state of Artsakh within the boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh and other areas of Azeri territory. The conflict was eventually halted via a Russian brokered peace agreement which essentially allowed Armenia to maintain its control over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and the additional parts taken from Azerbaijan.

The outcome of the first conflict was the status quo for 26 years, barring a few skirmishes between both sides in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia was naturally happy with this outcome, whilst Azerbaijan felt embarrassed by the loss of its territory. But instead of sulking over its defeat, Baku decided that Nagorno-Karabakh and the other Armenian annexed territories of Azerbaijan would someday return to its control. Azerbaijan never stopped referencing Nagorno-Karabakh as being its own, despite its lack of administration. To this narrative, Yerevan paid very little attention. Too little in fact.

Armenia was ignorant to a potential re-escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and failed to maintain the quality of its Armed Forces. All whilst Azerbaijan was doing the opposite. Between 2008 and 2019, Baku spent around $24 billion on the Azeri military, whilst Yerevan spent just under $4 billion on the Armenian counterpart. Armenia’s ignorance and ill preparedness for a return to conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh would very quickly prove costly.

In September 2020, Baku ordered a military operation to regain control of its previously lost territories to Armenia, including Nagorno-Karabakh. This started the second conflict period in the territory. The conflict lasted for less than 2 months and very much saw Azerbaijan come out on top. A ceasefire was brokered again by Moscow, which saw all of the Armenian occupied Azeri territory outside of Nagorno-Karabakh returned to the control of Baku, as well as parts of Nagorno-Karabakh. Additionally and significantly, Armenian peacekeeping troops were forced to leave the territory in order to be replaced by Russian peacekeeping forces. A victory in the eyes of Vladimir Putin, who has consistently shown his desires to maintain as much Russian influence in the post-Soviet arena as possible in recent years.

This ceasefire agreement held until 19 September this year, when Azeri forces returned to Nagorno-Karabakh to reclaim the rest of it for Baku. This time it was only 24 hours before a ceasefire was brokered by the Russian peacekeepers stationed in the territory. However, many reports stated that Azeri troops failed to follow the ceasefire and continued their mission to recapture Nagorno-Karabakh.

A mass exodus of Armenians from the territory has ensued over the last week, most of whom left using the ‘Lachin corridor’, which is the last remaining road connecting Armenia to Artsakh. Many of the Armenians who’ve fled have called what the Azeri military is doing in Nagorno-Karabakh,’ethnic cleansing’. On 28 September, in the latest update on the future of Nagorno-Karabakh, it was announced that representatives of the Republic of Artsakh had formally agreed to its administrative dissolution by January 2024.

This signals a potential end to the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, as following this announcement it’s extremely unlikely that many ethnic Armenians will remain in the territory. Many in Armenia have criticised Moscow over this recent crisis. One the one hand, questioning the commitment and actions of the Russian peacekeepers who were supposed to be in place to protect the ethnic Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. Whilst on the other, looking at the bigger picture and wondering whether this is a clear break in what has for decades been a close alliance between Yerevan and Moscow.

Russia has tried to maintain influence and cordial relations with all the former Soviet countries. In some cases, its influence has significantly paled, such as the European Baltic states. In others, its influence remains, not to a level of neo imperialism, but certainly to a level where there remains a significant persuasion of the populace who view Russian influence positively. Then there is another bracket. A bracket of states who still remain heavily influenced and aligned with the Kremlin.

It is in this bracket that we would usually place Armenia. Yerevan has strong economic and military ties to Moscow, through membership of both the Eurasian Economic Union (EEAU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Both of which are headquartered in, and dominated by the desires of the Kremlin. Socially and culturally there are also a lot of ties between the two states, with the prevalence of Orthodox Christianity and the extensive use of the Russian language within Armenian society.

So why has Russia’s position on Armenia seemingly changed? Why did Russia let Azerbaijan’s troops relaunch conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and ultimately let the Azeri government dissolve the Republic of Artsakh?

Well ultimately it comes down to Moscow’s desire to spread their influence as far as possible across the FSU. This desire sits above the strengthening of ties with any one particular state within this space. Russia’s intervention in Nagorno-Karabakh in the first place was done to expand such influence, above an interest in the preservation of its Armenian population. Russia’s initial position as a broker, allowed for it to not only maintain its very close ties with Armenia, but to also keep cordial relations between itself and Azerbaijan. A state with which Moscow has had mixed relations over the past two decades, but that it continues to supply militarily and also holds increasing economic ties with.

However, unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan is far from hooked on Russian influence and is significantly more powerful and independent. Russia’s position in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh significantly strained the relationship between Baku and Moscow. This led to Baku looking elsewhere for influence, as well as military and economic support in its claim to the territory, which is where we find the most compelling answer to Russia’s change in approach to Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey.

More precisely, the increasing influence of Turkish power and alliance amongst the Turkic states of the FSU. None more so than Azerbaijan, who has become an exceptionally close economic and strategic ally of the Erdoğan regime. This close relationship led to Turkey becoming involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Following the 2020 conflict in the territory, Turkey (alongside Russia) was involved in brokering the peace agreement. Part of this agreement was that Turkish peacekeeping troops would be allowed to patrol the reclaimed Azeri territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Additionally and most significantly, the Turkish brokers also managed to get the Armenian delegation to agree to unimpeded access between Azerbaijan’s main geographical body and its Nakhichevan exclave.

For Turkish power and influence, this move could potentially be revolutionary, as it would allow transportation access for Turkish vehicles all the way across, not Azerbaijan. Not just this, but it would also allow access to the other Turkic states of the FSU via the Caspian Sea.

To this proposal, Russia has two options. They can either kick up a fuss and try to block the proposal, in a way of trying to protect its own influence in Azerbaijan and the other Turkic states of the FSU. Or, they can piggyback the initiative and assist in brokering a deal which would see the formal construction of such a ‘corridor’ through Armenia, in the hope that this would win them favour with both Azerbaijan and Turkey. It has to be said, that out of these two options, the secondary would definitely seem more appealing to Moscow. Instead of fronting up to the increasingly powerful Turkic alliance and enforcing Russian influence, they can gamble and hope that assistance allows for maintenance of Russian ties in the Turkic states of the FSU.

This is likely the main reason why Russia has quickly shifted its position on Nagorno-Karabakh, it’s an indication to Baku that they will not stand in the way of the Eurasian Pan-Turkic project.

So what of relations between Yerevan and Moscow now? Will they ever recover?

Relations between the Kremlin and the current Armenian regime had become slightly strained since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yerevan had started to look for closer ties with ‘The West’ and more notably the EU, which rubbed Russia up the wrong way. However, due to Russia’s hefty influence in Armenia, there still remains to be a very high pro-Russian sentiment amongst its population. This pro-Russian sway will either pull the current regime in Yerevan back under the influence of Moscow, or see it replaced for one which would not stray from this position in the first place.

For Nagorno-Karabakh it certainly appears that its future is under the control of Baku, with it being highly unlikely for ethnic conflict to ever rage there again. Russia could have put up a fight against Azerbaijan’s occupation of the territory, in order to protect the many ethnic Armenians who call the region their home. But, as aforementioned, the Kremlin’s decision to not act in such a manner was very much driven with a look to the future and what was most beneficial to Moscow.