Somewhere Between Brussels and Red Square: Deciphering the Geopolitics of Serbia

POSTED: 13:00 (GMT) 31/10/2023

If people in ‘The West’ were asked to comment on their opinions of Serbia, the likelihood would be that such comments would not reflect the state in an overwhelmingly positive light. Here in ‘The West’, Serbia is best known for war criminals, its anti-NATO position, the war in Kosovo and of course Novak Djokovic.

It is fair to say that due to its history, especially that which encapsulated the fall of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo War, that Serbia is viewed by many as an enemy of ‘The West’. A position which is added to by their seemingly cosy relationship with Russia. It was of course Russia who intervened on the side of Serbia over the case of Kosovo and Russia today remains as the largest energy supplier to the state.

It is undisputed that there remains a positive attitude towards Russia amongst Serbians. At the start of the year, a survey was conducted which suggested that up to 66% of Serbs believe that Russia is Belgrade’s ‘greatest friend’. You walk the streets of Belgrade today and there are many signs of this positive attitude towards their ‘braća Rusi’ (Russian brothers). Russia Today, or RT as it is more commonly referred to (which is an immensely pro-Kremlin oriented media outlet) have their own Balkan channel, which is advertised widely across Serbia. The Russian energy giants Gazprom also advertise the ties between the two states through large billboards and posters. On a lower level, it is not uncommon to stroll past graffiti in the street which simply states ‘slava rusiji’ (glory to Russia), or to come across a street vendor selling t-shirts with Putin’s face on.

A Gazprom advertisement in central Belgrade. It shows the Serbian and Russian flags intertwined and simply says 'TOGETHER!'.

An RT advertisement in central Belgrade. One of hundreds I came across in the city.

Graffiti on the streets of Belgrade exclaiming 'glory to Russia'.

Given all this, it would therefore appear that the geopolitical allegiance of Belgrade is quite easy to explain. However, way back in 2009, Belgrade made a move which is often completely overlooked when examining Serbia’s geopolitical alliance. This was its formal application to join the EU, a move which comes directly into contradiction with its ties to the Kremlin.

It was uncertain what the EU would do over Serbia’s application. Just the year before, Belgrade had formally announced that it would never recognise the independence of Kosovo (territory which had previously been within the recognised borders of Serbia), a position which directly opposes that of the EU. However, ultimately recognising that they had an opportunity to move Serbia away from the realm of Russian influence.

Brussels formally added Serbia to the agenda for future enlargement in 2012. This opened the door to hundreds of millions of euros worth of EU funding to Belgrade. In exchange, Belgrade promised that they would make various reforms across the state in order to meet the criteria to formally join the Union. However, it’s now 2023 and Serbia is still outside the Union. But why?

Well, whilst in the past 11 years the EU has invested just under 2 billion euros into Serbia, Belgrade has not made any significant progress in meeting the eligibility criteria for actually joining the Union. In fact, the last 4 reports conducted by the EU’s investigative body on the matter, all concluded that there had been ‘no progress’ since the previous report. Interestingly, Belgrade has maintained the rhetoric that they do see a future within the EU. A perspective supported by the fact that in a recent survey on the matter of joining the EU amongst Serbs, the most popular opinion remained to be that as a move it would benefit the state.

All this begs another question. If Serbia is getting millions upon millions worth of investment every year from the EU and the people understand the potentially positive influence of joining the EU, why don’t they just work harder towards making the necessary reforms? It seems quite obvious to anyone on the outside. If only it really was that easy.

In order to pursue joining the EU, Serbia would be expected to all but completely close off relations and the lines of strategic communications with Moscow. A practice much easier said than done for Belgrade. To understand why this is, it’s important to have an insight into what has driven Russia and Serbia to be such strong allies in the first place and it’s important to understand their shared psyche.

There is a great and extremely lazy misconception that the close relations between Moscow and Belgrade stem from the Cold War period, as both were capitals of Socialist unions in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia respectively. However, as anyone who has ever studied Cold War history will know, the relationship between these two unions was for the most part non-harmonious. Instead, what binds these two together is their shared experience following the collapse of their respective socialist empires. Both Serbs and Russians felt greatly aggrieved and embarrassed by this loss in status and power. They also felt dually aggrieved by the actions of ‘The West’ following the collapses, as they felt a lack of respect for their cultural and historical identities.

The Kosovo War was really the marker for the start of this alliance, as when practically the entire Western world was condemning Belgrade for trying to maintain control of what it saw as its own, Russia was the biggest player pushing back. When NATO started its bombing campaign against Serbia, Russia was there to call it out for its negligence to international law. Russia won the hearts and minds of the Serbian people, as when the whole world seemed against them, it was there to stand by them.

For better or for worse, it must be understood why there remains such a strong feeling of positivity towards Russia amongst Serbs today. Add to this, the shared slavic identity and cultural components of both parties and it can be understood even further. Serbians are a generally highly nationalistic people, and many of them see Russia as having the capability to maintain and uphold this desire for nationalistic preservation. Now, there is no doubt that Russia has strategically capitalised on this position, using it to gain wider influence in the Balkans and across Europe, but that is not all Serbia is representative of to the Kremlin.

For Russia, looking at Serbia is sort of like looking in a mirror and so it is highly unlikely that it would want to see it slip into the hands of ‘The West’. In order to avoid this, they will likely continue to position themselves as a critical partner to Belgrade. Match to this the aforementioned positive opinions of Russia and the widespread fears amongst Serbs that their identity is under threat and you begin to really understand why joining the EU is not as easy as it may appear.

Serbians clearly recognise that their lives might be more comfortable and their country economically more powerful in the EU. However, for them this does not necessarily constitute a better existence. Sacrificing national identity, history and culture for economic benefit is not in the Serbian psyche. I’m not saying this is necessarily good or bad, it’s just the way they are as a people.

In diagnosing Serbia’s geopolitical alliance, it is difficult to state exactly where they sit. Overall they probably remain more ideologically aligned with the Kremlin, but are now more economically tied to Brussels, with the EU being their main investor. Dialogue is also generally strong between Brussels and Belgrade, but critically lapses on matters which threaten Serbian culture and identity.

It remains unlikely that this current scenario will alter in the near future, as Serbia looks set to continue trying to have slices out of differing geopolitical pies, whilst pedalling a state narrative of neutrality.