joelgibson.co.uk - 20 Years On: What Does the Kozak Memorandum Tell Us About Russia's Position

20 Years On: What Does the Kozak Memorandum Tell Us About Russia's Position on Transnistria?

POSTED: 09:00 (BST) 16/10/2023

Next month marks 20 years since the Kremlin’s last and only attempt at resolving the frozen conflict between the internationally recognised state of Moldova and the pro-Russian separatist state of Transnistria.

For those unfamiliar with the case of Transnistria, I will try to briefly explain it.

Transnistria is a de facto independent separatist state, born out of a messy post-Soviet conflict and situated within the borders of what is recognised as Moldova. Its existence can mainly be explained by the fact that its population (on the whole) hold little to no association with the majority Moldovan/Romanian ethnicity and identity generally held by citizens of the Republic of Moldova. Citizens of the territory which has come to constitute Transnistria, have for at least 250 years been of an Eastern Slavic ethnic majority of Russians and Ukrainians, who communicate in Russian.

The ethnic and social differentials between Moldovans and Transnistrians have significantly sculpted their international allegiances over time. In recent years, Chisinau (Moldova’s capital) has chosen to increasingly cooperate with the EU and ‘The West’. Alongside this, there have also been continuous rumours that they may attempt to integrate Moldova into Romania at some point.

In Transnistria, the allegiances lie well and truly with Moscow. Russia is seen as being the great protector by Tiraspol (Transnistria’s dedicated capital) and the wider Transnistria. This position is one which can be understood both by the examination of history and Russia’s current influence in the territory. Russian troops assisted Transnistria in gaining its independence and still have a presence of around 1,500 in the territory today. The Kremlin also pumps hundreds of millions of rubles a year into keeping Transnistria afloat and independent.

Russian Army Officer Barracks in Tiraspol (capital of the breakaway state of Transnistria).

The Russian and Transnistrian flags fly side by side in Tiraspol (capital of the breakaway state of Transnistria).

Russia’s maintained influence in the territory is a significant contributing factor into why there has never been a resolution to the conflict between Chisinau and Tiraspol, as Moscow has forced its way into having a say in any peace process. This is a peace process to which there has been very little contribution from either Tiraspol or Chisinau, as the former just desires recognised autonomy and the latter wants full administration over territory which it deems to be its own. What this has meant is that Moscow is the only party in the conflict resolution negotiations to have ever actually formalised a proposal for a solution in the aforementioned ‘Kozak Memorandum’(named after Russian politician Dmitry Kozak).

The Memorandum was tabled by Moscow in November 2003, but was eventually rejected by Chisinau due to fears that it would cede too much power over Moldovan politics to a Kremlin proxy in Transnistria.

To this day, the ‘Kozak Memorandum’ is the only lasting evidence that we, as analysts, have to understand the Kremlin’s policy towards Transnistria.

So what do its contents actually tell us about Russia’s position and attitude towards Transnistria?

Well, there are actually 3 interesting points we can take from the Memorandum which assist in developing an understanding of both Russia’s position on Transnistria’s future, and what it wants from its investment and continued support in the territory.

The first of these is that Russia desires a resolution to the issue of Transnistria.

This may seem an obvious assumption to make, but for a long while until the Memorandum was proposed many analysts saw that the unresolved status quo of Transnistria was what Russia desired. But, whilst there is no doubt that Transnistria’s current status favours Moscow over Chisinau, the economic drain of continuously funding it must not be underestimated, and so if Russia can source a way to lower this cost whilst maintaining influence they will.

The second takeaway from the Memorandum is that Russia does not desire a recognised independent Transnistrian state, nor does it see Transnistria’s future as being part of the Russian Federation.

In the memorandum Russia clearly outlines that Transnistria should be reabsorbed into a united Moldovan state, but that it shouldn’t fall under the administration of Chisinau. Instead, the Memorandum desired that Transnistria be turned into an autonomous territory within a newly created federation, titled, the ‘Federal Republic of Moldova’. This proposed federation provides us with the final and probably most critical insight into Russia’s desires for Transnistria.

Russia wants to utilise Transnistria as a geopolitical gambit, in the aim of building and maintaining influence over Moldova as a whole.

This point is evidenced even further when you examine the Memorandum’s proposed federalisation outcomes. The document dictates that Moldova will be divided between 3 administrative territories in Transnistria, the already autonomous and pro-Russian region of Gagauzia and the remainder of Moldova (referred to as ‘federal Moldova’). Each territory would have its own capital and control over their own internal affairs, with each having a say on matters concerning the entirety of the state, such as joining alliances like the EU or NATO.

What’s most telling of Russia’s desire to influence all of Moldova can be witnessed within the proposed process for passing laws regarding the entire state. The Memorandum states that for such laws to be passed they must be approved by no less than 75% of 26 representative senators from across the three territories. ‘Federal Moldova’ will hold the largest representation of senators at 13, whilst Transnistria would hold the second largest at 9 and Gagauzia would make up the 26 with 4. It doesn’t take a maths expert to work out that this split would essentially grant Transnistria the ability to veto any decision which went to the senate. In a wider context, it would in the very least geopolitically neutralise Moldova and at the very most, potentially end up forcing Chisinau to seek closer ties with Moscow to continue development.

In a wider context, the ‘Kozak Memorandum’ shows us that Russia’s desires for territory which it sees as its ‘near abroad’ are not always steeped in classical expansionism, but that actually it is influence that matters to the Kremlin.

Whether the frozen conflict case of Transnistria will ever see resolution is uncertain. What can be said is that in the current era of Russian Foreign Policy it seems certain that Moscow would not be willing to cede any control of Tiraspol to Moldova, whilst Chisinau would not accept a retabled ‘Kozak Memorandum’.